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Abstract

Internal security is very vital for the enhancement of sovereign and territorial integrity of any state. In this vein, any military operation is usually guided by special rules for opening fire in both international and non international armed conflict. However, warring parties, including military operators have, at one time or the other slightly observed and or maximally disregarded these rules during armed hostilities. The attendant implications of this misnomer is colossally jeopardizing in nature. Against this backdrop, this paper examines Military Operations Associated with Internal Security and Special Rules for Opening Fire in Armed Conflicts. Accordingly, Mechanism for enforcement of the law of armed conflicts, 1907 Hague Convention ix concerning the bombardment by naval forces in time of war, institutional mechanism of enforcement, United Nations convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, military mechanism of enforcement, types of military operations associated with internal security during armed conflicts, types of forces available to a state for internal security operations, types of military operations relating to security operations, problems faced by the armed forces during armed conflicts, the armed forces attitude to internal security operations, special rules for opening fire, the military rules of engagement, were appraised. Hence, the data for this work were collected mainly from secondary sources of recorded human documents. The research design was based on ex-post facto model of analysis. Our analytical frame work was based on the theory of armed conflicts. To this effect, it is found that military operations and internal security are highly essential for the observance of special rules for opening fire in any armed conflict. In other words, any disconnect between the two factors often lead to non-observance of special rules for opening fire during armed combats. The paper therefore recommends that the military should be re-structured in such a way that knowledgeable persons are charged with commanding responsibilities during armed hostilities.

Keywords: Internal Security, Military Operations, Law of Armed Conflict, Hague Convention, United Nations, Human Rights.

Introduction

Military operations can vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps to shape the

operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining a global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as civil support (CS) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But others can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to protect forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual major

military operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (Bassey, 2008:22). The Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (LCHR) are basically established to make to enable military forces to understand and implement their nation's commitment as to adhere to international legal instruments that control the use of force and treatment of persons in the context of all types of military operations, including those that involve international cooperation. D. Schindler and J. Toman (2010) posit that the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights would help commanders to conduct military operations including multinational military operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict and human rights law.

The application of international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) and human rights law to a variety of domestic and international operations including NATO, UN peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, border security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations are put into consideration, viz a viz, special rules for opening fire during armed conflicts. To this end, this paper raises some fundamental issues that border on Military Operations Associated with Internal Security and Special Rules for Opening Fire in Armed Conflicts, with the attendant hope of enhancing intellectual discourse of the subject matter in the 21st century.

Mechanism for Enforcement of The Law of Armed Conflicts

It is an established fact that all activities carried out in peacetime as combat are subject to an international accepted code of conduct, even though they will be conducted under stressful and often unsettling conditions. This code is known as the Law of Armed Conflicts (LOAC) Laws of War, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or Laws and Customs of War. The law comprises the Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions, as well as subsequent treaties, case law, and customary international law. It defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare, in relation to each other and to protected persons, usually meaningful civilians.

Christine, (2004:21) argues that LOAC is an internationally accepted legal code that is unconditionally binding on the conduct of all military operations. The individual combatants act for the nation in the application of lethal force although they are often operating under conditions of uncertainty and change. If confusion arises, combatant individual commanders and combatants at all levels can be held legally accountable for their actions. With this in mind, no other profession has the burden of responsibility that matches the one faced by combatants.

The LOAC arises from a desire among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war. LOAC regulates the conduct of armed hostiles. It also aims to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. According to Yoram (2004:39) the LOAC applies to International armed conflicts and in the conduct of military operations, as well as related activities in Armed Conflicts.

However, such conflicts are characteristic in nature. The two parts of the laws of war (or law of Armed Conflicts) (LOAC): law concerning acceptable practices while engaged in war, like the Geneva Conventions is called *jus in bellum*; while law concerning allowable justifications for armed force is called *jus ad bellum*". These laws are theoretically applicable only to nations which approve and consent to bind to them, usually in the form of international organizations of diplomacy, but in practice all nations are expected to follow the laws of war. Geopolitical conditions of a particular era often dictate which laws are enforced, and by whom.

Further, it has often been commented that creating law by something is inherently lawless as war seems like a lawless in absurdity. However, based on the adherence to what amounted to customary International law by warring parties through the ages, it was felt that codifying laws of war would be beneficial. According to Pascott (2008:13), some of the central principles underlying laws of war are:-

- Wars should be limited to achieving the political goals that started the war (e.g. territorial control) and should not include unnecessary destruction.
- Wars should be brought to an end as quickly as possible.
- People and property that do not contribute to the war effort should be

protected against unnecessary destruction and hardship.

To this end, laws of war are intended to mitigate the evils of war by:

- Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.
- Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons, who fell into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilian; facilitating the restoration of peace.

For the purpose of clarity and absolute comprehension of the subject matter, the discourse on the enforcement of law of armed conflicts will be weak if we don't build it on the foundation of certain international declarations and conventions. These declarations and conventions have gone a long way in identifying the facts about law of armed conflicts and its concomitant mechanism of enforcement.

1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning the Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War

His majesty the German Emperor, king of war of Prussia animated by the desire to realize the wish expressed by the first peace conference respecting the bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, and villages; whereas it is expedient that bombardments by naval forces should be subject to rules of general application which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants and assure the preservation of the more important buildings, by applying as far as possible to this operation of war, the principles of the regulations of 1899 respecting the laws and customs of land war.

Actuated accordingly by the desire to serve the interests of humanity and to diminish the severity and disasters of war; have resolved to conclude a convention to this effect.

This 1907 Hague convention ix concerning the bombardment by naval forces in time of war centers on the prohibition of the bombardment by Naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings. The prohibition does not include military or naval

establishments' depots of arms of war material which could be used for the needs of the hostile army.

In other to ensure effective enforcement, due notice must be given to the effect of bombardment and measures must be taken to spare sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic purposes and hospitals.

Institutional Mechanism Of Enforcement

The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The contracting parties to the above convention decide that genocide whether committed in time of peace or war is a crime under international law and is subject to sanctions. Genocide, according to the convention connotes the intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.

Contracting parties undertake to enact in accordance with their respective constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present convention. Persons charged with genocide acts enumerated in Article (iii) shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed.

The general assembly shall decide upon steps to take if a request for the revision of the convention emanates.

United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

The state parties to this convention, guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of halting the arms race, and of bringing about general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare determined to continue negotiations with a view to achieving effective progress, towards further measures in the field of disarmament.

Recognizing that scientific and technical advances may open new possibilities, with respect to the modification of the environment;

Recalling the declaration of the United Nations conference on the Human Environment adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972; Realizing that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelation of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations; Recognizing, however that military or any other hostile use of environmental modifications techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use and affirming their willingness to work towards the achievement of this objective. Also, to contribute to the strengthening of trust among unions and to the further improvement of the International situation, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The 1976 United Nations convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques maintains that each contracting state is restricted not to engage in military or use of environmental modification techniques, having severe effects as means of destruction to any other state party. The provision of this convention does not object to the use of environmental techniques for peaceful purposes with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Complaints may be lodged to the security council of the United Nations, if a state party to the convention perceives a breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the convention by another state party. However, a proposal may be made in respect to amendments on the convention, and shall enter into force with the acceptance of all states parties to the convention.

Military Mechanism of Enforcement

The military mechanism is believed to demonstrate some vigorous sense of practical capabilities in the battle field. These appear possible through some strategically designed arrangements of enforcing the law properly in a more military sense. These arrangements also cover internal disturbances, escalated tension and other similarly violent situations Whitely, (2009:24).

Types of Military Operations Associated With Internal Security During Armed Conflict

Here, we shall look at the involvement of the law and military in the internal security operations. Such include:

General

- Protecting persons and property (key points ups, vulnerable people such as judges, key witnesses, etc)
- Apprehending violators and suspected violators of the law
- Ensuring respect for the law.
- Preventing the escalation of violence.
- Surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance operations
- Evacuation operations

Specific

- Cordon and search operations (sealing off a village to search for offenders, weapons or equipment)
- Urban and rural patrols, possibly joint patrols with police or paramilitary forces.
- Manning observation posts, again in urban and rural settings.
- Guard duties at key point for VIPs
- Road blocks or vehicle check point (VCPs)
- Identity checks
- Controlling peaceful demonstrations
- Controlling or dispersing unlawful assemblies or demonstrations (riot situations)
- Enforcing curfews
- Making arrests
- Detaining persons
- Acting as a reserve or reinforce. I.e. quick reaction duties on standby for incidents.
- Keeping sides apart (manning a “peace line” or “green line”)
- Escort duties on standby for increment.
- Units the fire brigade
- Hostage rescue
- Cubbish

- Securing or picketing route for example to ensure safe passage of supplies through sensitive measures
- Bomb disposal, or sealing with improvised explosive devices (Eds)
- Many of the above tasks can involve searching people, vehicle and property.

Types of Forces Available to a State for Internal Security Operations

Generally, the state has three main types of force at their disposal:

The Armed Forces – the army, air force and navy. As we know, their main role is to defend the national territory from outside aggression

Paramilitary Forces – These normally have two roles: to support armed forces operations and to defend the state against outside aggression and to conduct internal security operations. Many paramilitary forces around the world are specially trained for internal security duties. Many countries have “Gendarmes” which often fulfill the same roles as we have described for paramilitary forces. Sometimes they are purely police forces.

Police Forces- These are usually trained and equipped for traditional policing roles and often also for certain levels of internal security duties. A state will use them for internal security operations for as long as possible. However, if the violence escalates, the police might be overextended and the civil authorities forced to request assistance. Any available paramilitary force will no doubt be the first to provide reinforcements in many ways. This makes a lot of sense to divert police from their primary role and might actually contribute to a breakdown of law and order. Who does the policing? Police are not normally trained and equipped to deal with increasing levels of violence. In conflict situations or situations of internal violence, the police remain the police. The threat to them and their type of work might change but they do not ever become armed forces.

What Forces are used is entirely a matter for the state, for our purpose, it is important to note the range of options available. Why? The reason is, as an armed force you might, be called upon to assist (Wippman and Evangelista, 2009:64). In providing this assistance, in the worst case you might be operating alone. In other situations, you might

be operating in support of a paramilitary force, a police force, or both.

Operation in this sort of environment can pose problems for the military. It might be difficult to conduct joint operations if there has been no prior training or liaison. The Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) even the basic ethos, ethics and outlook of these forces will differ considerably.

Types of Military Operations Relating to Security Operations

Military Engagement: Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.

Security Cooperation: Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations and a pillar of WMD nonproliferation. Note: Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities.

Deterrence: Deterrence helps prevent adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of counteraction.

Crisis Response or Limited Contingency Operations: Crisis response or limited contingency operations can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and/or prevent surprise attack or further conflict.

Major Operations and Campaigns: Major Operations and Campaigns involve large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as

possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN and the United States and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires joint forces to conduct stability operations to restore security, provide essential services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction.

Problems Faced by the Armed Forces During Armed Conflicts

The armed forces need to adjust to the demands of internal security operations. Let us therefore highlight some areas where they may have problems adjusting at the operations level. According to Von, (2009:57), one major problem for armed and paramilitary forces in internal security operations is that they may be unsure what law they are operating under. Other problems might include the issue of training. However, the main role of the armed forces and the paramilitary is to deal with Armed Conflicts. Almost all their training and their equipment is based on inflicting maximum damage and destruction on their opponents and defeating them in the shortest possible time within the rules and the law of Armed Conflicts (Chiaki et al, 2011:99). Key features of internal security operations, on the other hand, are restraint on the use of minimum force, of exactly the opposite of what is usually required of soldiers in conventional warfare. The reason is clear. Essentially they are now maintaining law and order among their own people in their own country. Soldiers need proper training to adjust to this new way of operating. Do not expect soldiers to know how to cope without training. If the army or paramilitary enter internal security operations completely cold, without training and detailed briefly on the applicable laws they will have problems. Because these situations require a cool head and majority, particular problems may be caused if young and inexperienced soldiers, whether conscripts or professional forces, are deployed of operations (Ogunjobi, 2009).

There are number of examples of highly regarded and well-trained conventional forces performing badly on internal security operations (Aluko, 2012:28). Some over react to the situation facing them and actually

exacerbate or prolong it, or cause more victims by their behavior. Let us not make the mistake of downplaying the pressure and difficulties faced by soldiers on such operations. However, let us be equally clear that soldiers who are well trained to make the necessary adjustments and led by good professional commanders will be able to cope with the demands of internal security operations. They quite simply must cope; otherwise they become a liability to themselves, their fellow soldiers and their unit. They are also a threat to the very people it is their duty to protect; the civilians caught up in the violence.

The Armed Forces Attitude to Internal Security Operations

A word on the attitude of the armed forces to their involvement in internal security operations, some regard such operations with contempt. They consider that they have a nobler role. Louise, (2005:74) argues that “The only reason they’ve called them in is because the police are inefficient and incapable of maintaining law and order” This rather arrogant but nevertheless often prevalent attitude can create major problems. Operationally, as we have said, these forces should work in “aid of the civil power” that is, in a secondary or supporting role to the police. In reality this quite often tends not to be the case on the ground. Armed forces in particular might be inclined to push the police aside and take the leading role. The legal system of most states will be based on the police primarily in such operations.

The Guidelines For Military Manuals, (2009: 311) provides that “the armed forces will often use the police when it suits them and will do things their own way when it does not” A further difficulty might be occasioned if the police are inadequately trained to deal with what for them might be an abnormal situation. Distrust between the armed forces and police can create all sorts of additional problems. Intelligence information tends to be jealously guarded and not shared. Duplication of effort due to mistrust results in inefficiency and undermines the state’s security efforts. Marco, (2005: 215) states that “joint training between the military and the police, will ease operational problems, increase co-operation between the

armed forces and civil authorities including the police". This is vital in such operations and the key to a successful restoration of law and order.

Special Rules for Opening Fire

There are two bodies of international law governing internal armed conflicts, such as civil wars and revolutions. Humanitarian law, or 'the law of armed conflict', applies to the parties to a conflict, laying down certain rules for the conduct of hostilities (combat), detaining prisoners, etc. The rules provided by humanitarian law are typically fairly specific, as they are designed to be interpreted and applied by military commanders. Best-Geoffrey, (1998:143), emphasizes that human rights law applies to interactions between a state and its citizens, requiring the government to respect rights to life, liberty, etc.

In a typical internal armed conflict, the government is one party to the conflict and some of the citizens, banded together as, say, a revolutionary army, are the other party to the conflict. The rules provided by human rights law are often rather vague, as they are designed to be interpreted and elaborated by courts and diplomatic discussion. Often the rules provided by human rights law and humanitarian law are harmonious or even redundant, but sometimes they appear to conflict. This is especially so with respect to the conduct of hostilities.

In general, firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender.

Apart from the general guidelines, there are some special rules regarding opening fire in internal security situations.

In any operational internal security scenario firearms may only be intentionally used when strictly unavoidable to protect life. According to Clifford, (2009:78), these strict rules go hand –in-hand with another concerning warning before opening fire. This is a major adjustment for a soldier, as a soldier you are simply not required under the law of Armed Conflicts to warn an opponent before you open fire, indeed to do so is tantamount to

committing suicide. (One exception is Prisoners Of War escapes, when warning shots are appropriate).

In the circumstances described above, soldiers must identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms. They must allow sufficient time for the warning to be observed:

- Unless to do so would unduly place the soldier at risk or would create the risk of death or serious harm to other person.

The program outlines 11 rules of behavior for soldiers during their operational activity in the territories. The subjects include "operational activity," "necessary force," "weaponry," "respect and humaneness," "cultural and religious artifacts," "those who surrender, or are captured, detained or delayed," "the wounded and the ill," "foreign representatives and members of international organizations," "treatment of special populations," and "reporting" (Kwakwa, 2002).

Again, newly recruited military officers issued with firearms need to re-qualify annually to continue using their weapons. Those who failed the re-qualification will have to return firearms, until he or she regains qualification. Annual re-qualification for firearms are routine for international law enforcement agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), UK police and the US Secret Service. Again, officers are briefed on the technical details of the Gluck pistol, and are taught to fire it from various positions -- standing, sitting, on the knees and prone. In the words of Okon, (2006:32), on order, enemy military and paramilitary forces are declared hostile and may be attacked subject to the following instructions:

- a) Positive identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next higher commander for decision
- b) Do not engage anyone who has surrendered or is out of battle due to sickness or wounds.
- c) Do not target or strike any of the following except in self-defense to

protect yourself, your unit, friendly forces, and designated persons or property under your control.

d) Do not fire into civilian populated areas or buildings unless the enemy is using them for military purposes or if necessary for your self-defense. Minimize collateral damage.

e) Do not target enemy infrastructure (public works, commercial communication facilities, dams), Lines of Communication (roads, highways, tunnels, bridges, railways) and Economic Objects (commercial storage facilities, pipelines) unless necessary for self-defense or if ordered by your commander. If you must fire on these objects to engage a hostile force, disable and disrupt but avoid destruction of these objects, if possible.

Furthermore, the use of force, including deadly force, is authorized to protect the following:

- The combatants, their units, and friendly forces
- Enemy Prisoners of War
- Civilians from crimes that are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, such as murder or rape
- Designated civilians and/or property, such as personnel of the Red Cross/Crescent, UN, and US/UN supported organizations.
- Treat all civilians and their property with respect and dignity. Do not seize civilian property, including vehicles, unless you have the permission of a company level commander and you give a receipt to the property's owner. Detain civilians if they interfere with mission accomplishment or if required for self-defense.

The Military Rules of Engagement

In military science, there are ugly nature of insurgencies; where insurgents are un-uniformed, unconventional fighters who move freely throughout the community during the

day, and become bushwhackers at night. They routinely use women and children as human shields, and often coerce the latter into the service of operating guerrillas. Smith, (2005:63), posits that this is particularly effective against U.S. forces, because the enemy knows that no matter how much stress they may be under, soldiers will go to great lengths to avoid killing women and children; and even hesitate (at great risk to themselves) when they see women and children shooting at them. Indeed, charges of civilian casualties and inappropriate rules of engagement would become a staple of enemy propaganda that rules of engagement would be modified, and that troops would become increasingly hesitant to fire on the enemy.

The military has also tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot the enemies. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act, or show clear hostile intent. A common misconception is that Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Law of War (LOW) are synonymous. While they are inextricably linked, they are not the same. (At least at this point,) LOW subsumes ROE. The term "Rules of Engagement," simply means "the manner in which you use force." It may have value as shorthand, but because it actually is a term of art with a real meaning, it tends to confuse the issue. The ROE cannot authorize anything that would be a LOW violation, but the ROE can prohibit many things (maybe anything) that are permitted by the LOW. In the final analysis, ROE is essentially a policy decision. It is the commanders, up to and including the President, determining what limitations on the use of force are advisable in order to facilitate accomplishment of the units' missions and the nation's goals. Rules Of Engagement (ROE) simply connotes the "supplemental measures" to the Special Rules Of Engagement (SROE). There are two types of supplemental measures, "those that authorize a certain action and those that place limits on the use of force for mission accomplishment." When we talk about the differences between Nigeria's ROE and the British' ROE, we are almost exclusively talking about the difference in the supplemental measures that have been approved for our use versus the supplemental

measures that have been approved for their use. For example, one of us might be allowed to use riot control agents, such as tear gas, while the other isn't (Stephenson, 2009:78).

It is crucial to understand and remember, therefore, that "ROE supplemental measures apply only to the use of force for mission accomplishment and do not limit a commander's use of force in self-defense." The reason this is so crucial to remember is because probably more than 95% of what we are doing over there is under the rubric of self-defense. ROE differences can only be the cause of the differences between how force is being used among Nation's state across the globe.

Conclusion

The Military of any country, no doubt, is trained to defend the territorial integrity of the Nation from both internal and external aggressions. In cases of wars especially in armed conflicts, the International Humanitarian law regulates most of military activities especially, military operations and special rules for opening fire. In this respect, it restrains certain obnoxious practices ranging from illegal arrest, taking of hostages, sexual violence, indiscriminate use and application of fire arms. According to Pogany, (2007:53) the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law requires armed combatants to balance the damage that their actions can cause to civilians against their expected military achievements during armed hostilities. In any defined military operations, clearly stated objectives should be demonstrated in order to avoid indiscriminate military activities.

Military Operations associated with internal security and special rules for opening fire are so fundamental to the point that it calls for a strategic synergy amongst nation states, during armed hostilities. These operations often run counter to the rules of opening fire in international and non – international armed conflicts. To this end, external and internal security of nation states is threatened extensively. Accordingly, military mechanism of enforcement should be re-designed by the United Nations in such a way as to accommodate considerably, types of military

operations associated with internal security during armed conflict (Okongu, 2008:76).

Again, most contemporary armed conflicts have observed glaring violations of the law of Armed Conflicts as a result of the unconventional nature of the war. The implication of this is that in a fought, the operations of armed combatants would not be regulated as regards what should be done, especially pertaining rules of opening fire, behavioural conduct and other military mechanisms.

Further, political propaganda is another strong weapon of fighting warfare. Klaruim, (2010:24) posits that it has the capability of setting a whole nation ablaze. In fact, it is a very strong military machinery of weakening enemies and launching serious attacks. Once propaganda is involved in any warfare; the output is usually breach of laws of war in all ramifications.

Therefore, the issue of military operations associated with internal security and special rules for opening fire in armed conflicts, remains intrinsically topical to contemporary scholarship as several lives and properties are lost following the non-observance of law of armed conflicts during wars. In the light of these realities, the military should be re-structured in such a way that knowledgeable persons are appointed to occupy strategic positions during armed combats, especially in Africa, where illiteracy is a major instrument that militate against military development. Adequate logistics should be provided for as well as periodic seminar, symposia as well as refresher courses be organized for the men and officers in the global military setting. With the adoption and execution of these, special rules for opening fire during armed conflicts would be minimally abused.

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