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MANAGING LEGISLATURE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND CONFLICT IN THE NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

This study focused on the management of the legislature-executive relations and conflicts in the Nigerian presidential democracy. The specific objectives were to assess the influence of perceived political structure, modality and interaction on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. Data were sought through survey-based research. The study considered the total of 500 (five hundred) for its population. Purposive sampling was adopted to select five (five hundred) respondents. The data generated for the study were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential analytical techniques. The analytical technique employed was Multiple Regression Analysis and Logit Regression Analysis. Findings showed that modality, interaction and perceived political structure have significant influence on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. It is further found that modality contributes to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. The study concluded that a sound presidential democracy hinges on a well-designed political structure where the legislature-executive relations and conflicts are constructive and effectively managed. The study recommended that the executive and the legislature arms should embrace clear modality, effective interaction and strong political structure as they significantly and positively influence the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria.

Contribution/ Originality: This study contributes in the existing literature by providing evidence that effectiveness of executive-legislature relations is a function of perceived political structure, modality and interaction. This study is one of the very few studies that have been conducted to investigate managing executive-legislature relations and conflicts in Nigeria.

1. INTRODUCTION

In Nigeria today, the observed socio-political and economic outlooks are function of good governance. Governance seems to be cardinal to progress of whatever kinds in Nigeria. It is the true pipeline for 'social, political and economic progresses of any nation. The pivot roles of governance in the socio-political and economic growth and development cannot be over-emphasized. Importantly, good governance is driven by effective process and structure that can propel socio-political and economic growth and development for Nigeria. The structure of the state and the procedures of the legislative, judicial, executive and administrative bodies at all the tiers of government are inevitable. With respect to this opinion, a sound model of governance is a panacea to drive socio-political and economic growth and development for Nigeria.

Adebo (2011) noted that the rationale behind having the legislature is to complement the development of a vibrant presidential framework. The legislature, *entomb alia*, needs to build a relationship with the executives for productive presidential framework. An arrangement for the unmistakable separation of jobs and powers of the executive and the legislature must be established to also bring about good relations. In this way, while each arm is vested with control over some characterized exercises of government, in numerous regards, be that as it may, conjugal efforts and collaboration are naturally required for the exercise of power (Yinka, 2009). In this new framework, there is a reasonable partition between the executive and the legislature; the executive getting its capacity from the direct prominent vote of the electorate and from the constitution.

Following the appropriation of the presidential framework in Nigeria, consequently, no one arm of government is better than the other, nor is any subordinate to the next. Every organ is autonomous and effective in its own reach. In spite of the fact that the 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers on the three separate arms of government, the division of powers is not made to organize separation of any arm of government. Along these lines the meaning of powers to each arm just guarantees an interlocking arrangement of governing rules as opposed to an outright separation of powers, which is impracticable.

According to Kopecky (2014) the relationships between the legislature and the executive are one of the key characterizing qualities of the working of any political framework. It is fundamental to the constitutional and political system of any region and has been at the bleeding edge of legislative debate in recent times. These relationships are unpredictable, contingent upon a scope of formal and casual practices. The constitutional prerogatives vested in legislatures and the executive are, of course, most important because they structure the interactions between the two powers (National Democratic Institute, 2000).

Constructive relationships between the executive and the legislative arms of government are basic to the effective maintenance of the constitution and the rule of law (Holme, 2007). Recently, the character of these connections has relationships altogether, both in view of changes in governance and more extensive societal changes. Researchers have been communicating varying perspectives on executive and legislative relations, both about conflict and cooperation, regardless of whether either commands, and whether advantages or liabilities result from either (Kopecky, 2014; Magill, 2001). Although some see conflict between the executive and legislative bodies as a critical and beneficial precondition for regulating and managing government, others see it as contributing to the gridlock over essential public policy decisions, rendering government dysfunctional in this way (Dulani & Donge, 2006; Mbah, 2007).

Scholastic interest has been the degree to which law-making bodies keep up practical, autonomous positions in public policy-making in the face of influence of the chief executive- the governor especially, in a presidential framework (Bernick & Wiggins, 1981; Cheibub, 2007). These findings therefore necessitate investigation into the management of legislature and executive relationship at the state level of Nigeria's presidential system of governance. Such diagnosis will convey to spotlight the nature of legislature-executive relations in the federating units of Nigerian presidential framework and the variables causing such relationship with the end goal of conveying to the fore substantial modalities for improving legislature and executive relations.

1.1. Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to investigate the management of the legislature-executive relations and conflicts in the Nigerian presidential democracy considering Nigeria. The specific objectives were to:

i. Assess the influence of perceived political structure, modality and interaction on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.
ii. Ascertain the factors influencing the legislature-executive conflicts in Nigeria.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Conceptual Framework

Conflict management is the method of restricting the conflict's adverse elements while improving the conflict's beneficial elements. Managing conflicts that exist between the executive and legislature is targeted towards improving holistic results in a democratic system, and bringing about efficiency or effectiveness in governance. The effective management of conflict is likely to translate into cooperation that is beneficial to the democratic process. When this cooperation happens, it strengthens the democratic process, promotes good governance and responsible leadership, promotes transparency and accountability in governance, assists the executive to be focused and committed to delivering good governance to the citizens and helps the legislature to make efficient laws that will promote good governance and curb corruption (Jibueze & Ehikioya, 2018). On the other hand, unmanaged conflicts between the two arms are likely to slow the pace of socio-political development of Nigeria. Unresolved conflicts slows down the pace of governance, creates suspicion and hostility, encourages bad governance, creates distraction and tension, and encourages the culture of impunity and disregard for the rule of law among the political class, with attendant political instability that divides the populace (Jibueze & Ehikioya, 2018).

Various names have indeed been given to the word 'legislature' all around the world. It is referred to as 'National Assembly' in Nigeria (Abonyi, 2006; Heywood, 2007; Lafenwa, 2009). Lafenwa (2009) expressed that its meaning is not severely contested. The legislature is seen as a key player in government machinery (Heywood, 2007) and as a subsidiary with the distinctive purpose of articulating and expressing the people's collective will (Bernick & Lee, 2008; Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). It is the forum for the representation of the electorates as a government body. Legislature is responsible for law-making in a democratic system of government, it is usually made up of elected people by popular suffrage. The legislature is seen as occupying a key position in the machinery of government and as the people branch with the singular purpose of articulating and expressing the collective will of the people (Fatile & Adejuwon, 2016). The strength and the state of the legislature have been identified as among the strongest predictors of a country's democratic development and survival (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010).

The executive is at the core of government in a democratic framework. The executive is responsible for providing good and responsible governance for the state. In general form, the concept 'executive' is taken to mean all the functionaries, political power-holders and permanent civil servants who undertake the execution of laws and policies and run the administration of state. The executive is known for policies development and supervision of the implementation of laws and the policies. It is the arm of government that is basically concerned with the application of policies of any society. It is the executive which formulates and then implements various policies. However, Anifowose (2008) considers the executive as the branch of government in charge of implementing a society's authoritative laws and policies. Ikoronye (2015) describes the executive as the governing body responsible for implementing the legislation passed by the legislature subject to the judiciary's decision and instructions. Executive initiates measures and programs, executes them after the assembly has passed them into law, and coordinates public measures similarly to guarantee that policy execution takes place within the framework of the initial plan and the approved policy of the legislature. Fashagba (2010) considers the executive as strategically significant for the achievement of democratic products.

One of the main features of the functioning of any political system is the relationships between the legislature and the executive (Kopecky, 2014). It is essential to any state's constitutional and political system and has been at the forefront of latest legislative discussion. Depending on a range of formal and informal methods, these relationships are complicated. Naturally, the constitutional prerogatives in legislatures and the executive are most essential because they structure the relationships between the two powers (National Democratic Institute, 2000). However, various modalities and conventions are also very essential (Bernick & Lee, 2008). Constructive relations between the executive and the legislative branches of government are vital to socio-political process (Holme, 2007). Assessment of these relationships will highlight the nature of legislative-executive relationships, the factors that

give rise to such relationships and consequential conflict in order to highlight viable ways of solving conflictual issues and ensuring the strengthening of democracy.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

The place of theories in researches cannot be over-emphasized. Theory provides assumptions upon which the foundational structure a research is built. As posited by Bunch (2015), a theory gives a framework for evaluating various strategies in both the long and short run, and for seeing the types of changes that they are likely to produce. For the purpose of this study, Structuration Theory was adopted.

A British sociologist called Anthony Giddens was known for propounding the theory of structuration. He gave an account of the constitution of social life that set theoretical positions and traditions apart and questioned them (Cohen, 1989). The theory of structuration attracted considerable attention, and countless books and articles emerged quickly to discuss, scrutinize, support or criticize Giddens' thoughts. Giddens was largely obsessed with practical politics. He contributed colossally to the British government from 1997 through his many write-ups (for example, Beyond Left and Right written in 1994, The Third Way written in 1998 and The Third Way and Its Critics written in 2000).

The theory of structuration assumes the existence of duality of structure in the presidential democracy; that is, the relationship between the executive-legislature's acts and structure of government is among the most pervasive and difficult issues in the presidential democracy. In this study, the executive-legislature's act is used to replace the basic human acts. Lamsal (2012) stated that "basic human acts and resulting activities can be seen as the two defining capabilities of what Gidden termed the 'Agency' in his theory. Giddens distinguishes between "acts as a separate progression of action and action as a continuous low level of involvements by different and autonomous human agents". In respect of the duality of structure, the following questions are paramount:

1.   How are the activities of the legislative-executive linked to structural characteristics of the presidential democracy?

2.   How are actions structured in everyday contexts?

To examine the dualism between structure and agency, Giddens departed from the conceptualization of structure as some given or external form (Lamsal, 2012). Structure is what gives "form and shape to social life, but it is not itself the form and shape" (Giddens, 2009).

More specifically according to Jones (2012) Giddens identifies "three dimensions of structure, drawing, it may be argued, on Durkheim, Marx and Weber, which he terms signification, domination and legitimation" (p. 6). These are linked with corresponding dimensions of agency, described as communication, power and sanctions, through modalities of, respectively, interpretive schemes, facilities and norms as shown in Figure 1 (Jones & Karsten, 2003).


Figure-1. The dimensions of the duality of structure.
Source: Jones and Karsten (2003).

Modalities can therefore be viewed as the locus of communication between legislative executive's knowledgeable capabilities and the political system structural characteristics. It must also be emphasized

that the division of the structure duality into these three dimensions is primarily an analytical tool; in reality they are integrally interlinked. For example the operation of norms depends upon power relationships for their effectiveness and is deployed through symbolic and linguistic devices (Moore, 2008). Thus, the relationship between the executive and legislative arms in the Nigerian presidential system reflects the influence of the political structure, modality and interaction by individual's conformance with accepted practice. It is expected by the two arms to operate in accordance with the constitutionally laid down structure, with significant modalities that inform the understanding of the members of the two arms the roles they are to play. Giddens emphasizes that structures do not exist independent of human action, nor are they material entities (Jones, 2012).

3. METHODOLOGY

Based on the nature of the study, data were sought through survey-based research. The study made use of well-structured questionnaire. This facilitated the collection of viable data for scientific verification. The study considered the total of 500 (five hundred) for its population. The study's universe is made up of political analysts and other political stakeholders with appreciable knowledge of executive-legislative relationship. In this study, multi-stage sampling technique was adopted. The study adopted a purposive sampling to select five (five hundred) respondents. This was non-probabilistic, and the sample was chosen based on similar features of differently identified population in Nigeria. The data generated for the study were analyzed using both descriptive and inferential analytical techniques. The analytical technique employed was Multiple Regression Analysis and Logit Regression Analysis. The models were specified. The Equation 1 shows that the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations is a function of perceived political structure, modality and interaction. The Equation 2 shows the mathematical expression of the influence of factors on the legislature-executive conflicts in Nigeria

$$PSD = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + e \tag{1}$$

Where,

PSD = dependent variable (the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations)

a = constant

x_1, x_2, x_3 are independent variables (perceived political structure, modality and interaction)

X_1 = Perceived political structure

X_2 = Perceived modality

X_3 = Perceived interaction

.β_1, β_2, β_3 are regression coefficients which determine the contribution of the independent variables.

e = residual or stochastic term

$$\text{Log } h_0(t) = \alpha(t) + \beta_1X_{i1} + \beta_2X_{i2} + \beta_3X_{i3} + \beta_4X_{i4} + \beta_5X_{i5} + \beta_6X_{i6} + \beta_7X_{i7} + \beta_8X_{i8} + \beta_9X_{i9} + \beta_{10}X_{i10} + \beta_{11}X_{i11} + \beta_{12}X_{i12} + \beta_{13}X_{i13} + u_i \tag{2}$$

Where

i is a subscript for observation

Xs' are the covariates

α is a constant and

β = is the vector of parameters

Where,

X_1, = perceived executive dominance,

X_2, = oversight function of the legislature,

X_3, = pride and personality clash,

X_4, = ignorance of the constitution,

X_5 = struggle for power and domination

X_6 = highhandedness of the executive over the legislature,

X_7 = greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs,

X_8 = lack of patriotism,

X_9 = corruption,

X_{10} = poor leadership skills,

X_{11} = ethnicity,

X_{12} = godfatherism

X_{13} = attempts to personalize political authority

U_1 = Error term

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table-1a. Showing the multiple regressions on the influence of political structure, modality and interaction on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.678[a]	.459	.458	1.03642
2	.752[b]	.566	.564	.92951
3	.768[c]	.590	.587	.90407

Note: Predictors in the Model: Modality, interaction and perceived political structure
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Table 1a shows the effects of three variables (modality, interaction, perceived political structure) on effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. The adjusted R-squared compares the goodness-of-fit for the regression models that contain differing numbers of the independent variables (modality – 0.458, interaction- 0.564 and perceived political structure- 0.587). The result of the coefficient of determinations shows that modality (R^2 = 0.459), interaction (R^2 = 0.566) and perceived political structure (R^2 = 0.590) have explanatory power over the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. It is seen that 45.9% variation in the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria is explained by modality, 56.6% variation in the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria is explained by interaction and 59.0% variation in the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria is explained by perceived political structure. The unexplained variations in (modality – 54.1%, interaction – 43.4% and perceived political structure – 41.0%) show that there are other variables that can predict effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. All the coefficient of determinations (R^2 value) proved that these variables have strong effects on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria

Table-1b. Showing the ANOVA of political structure, modality and interaction on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	355.483	1	355.483	330.940	.000[b]
	Residual	418.923	390	1.074		
	Total	774.406	391			
2	Regression	438.311	2	219.156	253.653	.000[c]
	Residual	336.095	389	.864		
	Total	774.406	391			
3	Regression	457.274	3	152.425	186.486	.000[d]
	Residual	317.132	388	.817		
	Total	774.406	391			

Note: Predictors in the Model: Modality, interaction and perceived political structure
Dependent Variable: Effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Table 1b reports that using the model is better than guessing the mean. The mean square residual values (1.074 for modality, 0.864 for interaction and 0.817 for perceived political structure) are smaller, indicating less deviation between the observed and fitted values. The *P*-value for the *F* test statistic (330.940 for modality, 253.653 for interaction and 186.486 for perceived political structure) are less than 0.001, providing strong evidence against the null hypotheses. The coefficient of determination in Table 1a for modality (R^2 = 0.459), interaction (R^2 =

0.566) and perceived political structure (R²= 0.590) have explanatory power over the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria.

Table-1c. Showing the Coefficients of the influence of political structure, modality and interaction on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

	Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Std Coef	T	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.047	.148		7.075	.000		
	Modality.	.728	.040	.678	18.192	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	.219	.157		1.393	.164		
	Modality.	.512	.042	.477	12.179	.000	.727	1.376
	Interaction.	.423	.043	.384	9.791	.000	.727	1.376
3	(Constant)	-.091	.166		-.547	.585		
	Modality.	.374	.050	.349	7.495	.000	.488	2.050
	Interaction.	.408	.042	.370	9.672	.000	.723	1.384
	Perceived political structure.	.241	.050	.208	4.817	.000	.569	1.759

Note: a. Dependent Variable: effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Table 1c shows the coefficients of the variables and effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. The coefficient of modality (unstandardized beta- 0.728) shows a positive relationship with the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. The coefficient of modality (standardized beta- 0.678; p-value = 0.01) shows greater than average contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Modality has higher coefficient more than the interaction; given the modality (unstandardized beta- 0.512) and interaction (unstandardized beta- 0.423). It is seen also that modality has more contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations compared to the interaction; given the modality (standardized beta- 0.477; p-value = 0.01) and interaction (standardized beta- 0.384; p-value = 0.01). The results prove that modality and interaction have positive contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Finally, the results in Table 1c show that perceived political structure has the least coefficient (unstandardized beta- 0.241) compared with modality (unstandardized beta- 0.374) and interaction (unstandardized beta- 0.408). Interaction has the highest contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations; given that interaction (standardized beta- 0.370; p-value = 0.01), modality (standardized beta- 0.349; p-value = 0.01) and perceived political structure (standardized beta- 0.208; p-value = 0.01). The result proves that modality, interaction and perceived political structure have positive relationship with the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

Table-2. Showing factors influencing the legislature-executive conflicts.

S/N	Variables	Coefficient	Standard error	P>|Z|
X_1	Perceived executive dominance	.344	.148	.020**
X_2	Oversight function of the legislature	.150	.179	.401
X_3	Pride and personality clash	.647	.157	.000**
X_4	Ignorance of the constitution	.280	.244	.251
X_5	Struggle for power and domination	.616	.127	.000**
X_6	Highhandedness of the executive over the legislature	-.210	.178	.238
X_7	Greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs	-.303	.196	.123
X_8	Lack of patriotism	2.573	.304	.000**
X_9	Corruption	-.864	.879	.326
X_{10}	Poor leadership skills	.327	.317	.303
X_{11}	Ethnicity	-.573	.298	.054*
X_{12}	Godfatherism	-.054	.455	.906
X_{13}	Attempts to personalize political authority	-.322	.945	.733

Note:
Number of obs. = 392
LR chi² = 668.827
Prob > chi² = 0.000
Pseudo R² = 0.863
NB: Figures and stars in parenthesis are z-values * and ** denotes 5% and 1% significance respectively.

Table 2 shows Logit Regression coefficient of factors influencing the legislature-executive conflicts in the study area. It is observed that perceived executive dominance (β= 0.344; p-value= 0.020), pride and personality clash (β= 0.647; p-value= 0.01), struggle for power and domination (β= 0.616; p-value= 0.01), lack of patriotism (β= 2.573; p-value= 0.01), and ethnicity (β= -0.573; p-value= 0.05) significantly influence the legislature-executive conflicts in the study area. All the variables influence legislature-executive conflicts except ethnicity which was found to enter the model with a negative sign. Perceived executive dominance seems to have weak influence on legislature-executive conflicts based on the fact that it is less than 50%. Lack of patriotism has extremely strong influence on legislature-executive conflicts based on the fact that it is more than 100%.

Factors such as oversight function of the legislature (β= 0.150; p-value> 0.05), ignorance of the constitution (β= 0.280; p-value> 0.05), highhandedness of the executive over the legislature (β= -0.210; p-value> 0.05), greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs (β= -0.303; p-value> 0.05), corruption (β= -0.864; p-value> 0.05), poor leadership skills (β= 0.327; p-value> 0.05), godfatherism (β= -0.054; p-value> 0.05), and attempts to personalize political authority (β= -0.322; p-value> 0.05) insignificantly influence legislature-executive conflicts.

From the result of the Logit Regression on Table 2, the Likelihood Ratio Tests (LR) of 668.827 and adjusted (Pr) 0.000 which implies that 100% of the changes experienced in legislature-executive conflicts were explained by the variables in the model. The Pseudo R^2 of 0.863 indicates that 86.3% of the change in legislature-executive conflicts in the study area is influenced by perceived executive dominance, oversight function of the legislature, pride and personality clash, ignorance of the constitution, struggle for power and domination, highhandedness of the executive over the legislature, greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs, lack of patriotism, corruption, poor leadership skills, ethnicity, godfatherism and attempts to personalize political authority. Though, only five of the variables have linear relationship with legislature-executive conflicts on individual ground.

5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Findings show that modality, interaction and perceived political structure have significant influence on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. It is further found that modality contributes to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. It is seen that when there is an existing modality the executive and legislature are guided. The implication is that the executive-legislature relations will be more strengthened and becomes more effective. The interaction between the executive and legislature has more contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. Empirical finding shows that interaction has significantly positive contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. Perceived political structure has positive contribution to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. This implies that effective executive-legislature relations premise on strong political structure.

Findings show that legislature-executive conflicts in the study area is influenced by perceived executive dominance, oversight function of the legislature, pride and personality clash, ignorance of the constitution, struggle for power and domination, highhandedness of the executive over the legislature, greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs, lack of patriotism, corruption, poor leadership skills, ethnicity, godfatherism and attempts to personalize political authority. Finding further shows that only perceived executive dominance, pride and personality clash, struggle for power and domination, lack of patriotism and ethnicity significantly influence the legislature-executive conflicts. This finding supports the study of Godswealth, Ahmad, and Jawan (2016) which asserted that perceived executive dominance can influence the executive-legislature conflicts. The finding of the study also aligns with the position of Momodu and Ika (2013) that pride and personality clash and struggle for power and domination can influence the executive-legislature conflicts. The finding of the study on lack of patriotism supports the assertion of Igbokwe-Ibeto and Anazodo (2015).

The influence of factors such as oversight function of the legislature, ignorance of the constitution, highhandedness of the executive over the legislature, greed and hypocrisy of members of the two organs,

corruption, poor leadership skills, godfatherism and attempts to personalize political authority on legislature-executive conflicts are insignificant. The finding of this study advances the assertion of Godswealth et al. (2016) that oversight function of the legislature can influence the executive-legislature conflicts. The finding of the present study refutes the position of Momodu and Ika (2013) that ignorance of the constitution can influence the executive-legislature conflicts. Igbokwe-Ibeto and Anazodo (2015) also found that corruption and poor leadership skills influence the executive-legislature conflicts.

6. CONCLUSION

A sound presidential democracy hinges on a well-designed political structure where the legislature-executive relations and conflicts are constructive and effectively managed. It is no doubt that a relationship without any element of conflict between the legislature and the executive could be dangerous for the socio-political development process of Nigeria.

The legislature-executive conflicts may also be described by struggle for political power and domination, processes re-engineering, pride and personality clash and oversight function of the legislature. Though, it was empirically proven that executive dominance, pride and personality clash, struggle for power and domination, lack of patriotism and ethnicity significantly influence the legislature-executive conflicts. There are other unexplained variables that can account for legislature-executive conflicts. Conflict arising from oversight function of the legislature is constructive and needed to transform the socio-political development in the Presidential Democracy of Nigeria.

However, empirical investigation reveals that modality, interaction and perceived political structure have significant influence on the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria. Where there is modality that clearly states out clearly appropriate way operation, the executive-legislature relations are likely to be effective. The bond between the executive and legislature is likely to be effective where good and productive interaction exist. Empirical evidence abound that interaction significantly contributes to the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations. So is also the perceived political structure. It has been empirically verified and proven to have linear relationship with the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, it was recommended that:

1. The executive and the legislature arms should embrace clear modality, effective interaction and strong political structure as they significantly and positively influence the effectiveness of executive-legislature relations in Nigeria.

2. The executive and the legislature arms should discourage executive dominance, pride and personality clash, struggle for power and domination and lack of patriotism as they significantly influence destructive legislature-executive conflicts.

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