Abstract
In fashion with the ASEAN neighbors, political parties in Thailand have been frivolously adopting populist campaigns. Such wide spread scenario demands an extrapolation of the fiscal loopholes that enables exploitation of the system in favor of short-run political gains. Occasional populist schemes were formerly viewed as short term ad-hoc expenditure, very unlikely to cause prolonged fiscal burdens. This paper argues from the historical perspectives that once the campaigns have started, successive governments tend to continue to offer similar or larger provisions with only a slight modification. Constrained by budgetary gridlocks and political pressure that would impact the next election, off-budgetary expenditure tends to become very customary for all future governments owing to the country’s relatively loose legal framework for monitoring and surveillance of its usage. This paper asserts that, with ample fiscal loopholes for political maneuvering, these populist schemes tend to continue on top of the existing fiscal burden and exacerbate the rural-urban dichotomy in Thailand.